Macroeconomic consequences of migration diversion : a CGE simulation for Germany and the UK by Baas, Timo & Brücker, Herbert
IAB Discussion Paper 3/2008
Timo Baas 
Herbert Brücker
Macroeconomic consequences  
of migration diversion
A CGE simulation for Germany and the UK
Beiträge zum wissenschaftlichen Dialog aus dem Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung  IAB-Discussion Paper 3/2008 
Macroeconomic consequences of migration 
diversion 
A CGE simulation for Germany and the UK 
Timo Baas (IAB) 
Herber Brücker (IAB) 
Mit der Reihe „IAB-Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur  
für Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche 
Verbreitung von Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung  
Kritik angeregt und Qualität gesichert werden. 
The “IAB Discussion Paper” is published by the research institute of the German Federal 
Employment Agency in order to intensify the dialogue with the scientific community.  
The prompt publication of the latest research results via the internet intends to stimulate 
criticism and to ensure research quality at an early stage before printing. Macroeconomic consequences of migration
diversion: a CGE simulation for Germany and the
UK
Timo Baas Herbert Br uckery
July 2007
Abstract
This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of the di-
version of migration 
ows away from Germany towards the UK in the
course of the EU Eastern Enlargement. The EU has agreed with the
new member states from Central and Eastern Europe transitional pe-
riods for the free movement of workers. The selective application of
migration restrictions during the transitional periods has resulted in
a reversal of the pre-enlargement allocation of migration 
ows from
the new member states across the EU: Germany as the main destina-
tion before enlargement attracts only modest immigration 
ows since
2004, while the UK and Ireland which have been only marginally af-
fected by immigration prior to enlargement absorb about 60% of the
in
ows in the post-enlargement period. The macroeconomic eects of
this diversion process is analysed in this paper on the basis of a CGE
model which considers wage rigidities. We nd that higher migration
is associated with larger GDP and employment gains, but also with
a smaller wage increase and a smaller decline of the unemployment
rate. The diversion of migration 
ows away from Germany towards
the UK yields thus a higher GDP and employment growth in the UK.
The joint GDP of Germany and the UK declines by 0.1 per cent as a
consequence of the migration restrictions.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of the diversion of
migration 
ows during the transitional periods for the free movement of
workers in the course of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union
(EU). The EU has admitted eight new member states from Central and
Eastern Europe in 20041 and another two countries in 2007.2 The income
gap between the incumbent and the new member states is in case of the EU
Eastern enlargement larger than in previous accession rounds. At current
exchange rates, the gross national income per capita of the ten new member
states (NMS-10) amounts to 21 per cent of the EU-15, and { measured in
purchasing power parities { to roughly 40 per cent of the EU-15 in 2005
(World Bank, 2007). This large income gap has fanned fears that the re-
moval of immigration restrictions will yield a mass migration wave which will
subsequently depress wages and increase unemployment in the incumbent
EU member states.
Against this background the EU-15 countries decided at the European
Council to impose transitional periods for the free movement of workers
from the NMS. The so-called "2+3+2" formula allows the individual mem-
ber states to suspend the free movement of workers for a period of up to
seven years. Extension of the transitional period is rst considered after
two years, then for a second time after three years. A second prolongation
of the transitional period requires that the member state announces serious
imbalances in its domestic labour market. However, the application of tran-
sitional periods for the free movement remains a sovereign decision of the
individual member state.
In the course of the 2004 enlargement round, only Sweden applied fully
the Community Law for the free movement of workers, and the UK and Ire-
land opened their labour markets without restrictions. Although most other
EU member states have opened their labour markets partially by granting
work permits for seasonal workers, (small) immigration quotas or by con-
cluding bilateral guestworker agreements, the remaining migration restric-
tions can be regarded as relatively tight in the sense that they eectively
hindered labour migration between the new and the incumbent member
states.3
1The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Repub-
lic and Slovenia joined the EU at May 1, 2004. Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU in
2004, but the transitional periods for the free movement of workers do not apply to them.
2Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU at January 1, 2007.
3For details see European Commission (2006) and European Commission (2007).
2The selective application of migration restrictions during the transitional
periods had two eects: First, the existing restrictions have eectively hin-
dered migration such that total migration into the EU is lower than in case
of an EU-wide application of the Community Law for the free movement of
workers. Second, it is likely that migration 
ows have been diverted away
from the preferred destinations towards countries which have opened their
labour markets immediately after the EU Eastern enlargement.
In this paper we analyse the macroeconomic eects of this diversion
process for the two economies which are mainly aected in absolute terms,
Germany and the UK. We therefore apply dierent policy scenarios for iden-
tifying the macroeconomic eects of migration diversion. The rst policy
scenario assumes that the existing immigration policies are maintained until
the end of the transitional periods in 2011, i.e. that Germany continues
to opt for a restrictive immigration policy while the UK keeps the doors
for labour migration from the eight new member states from Central and
Eastern Europe (NMS-8) open. The second policy scenario relies on the as-
sumption that both Germany and the UK have opened their labour markets
for migrants from the NMS-8 already in 2004, which implies that Germany
receives more and the UK less migrants. Both scenarios rely on counter-
factual assumptions about the length of transition periods. In a companion
paper (Baas and Br ucker 2007) we have already examined the impact of
recent trade, capital and migration 
ows on the economies of Germany and
the UK.
The analysis is based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model,
which allows simulating the impacts of migration, trade and capital move-
ments simultaneously.4 The CGE model employed here considers wage
rigidities and unemployment which is particularly relevant in the European
context where many countries suer from high unemployment. More speci-
cally, we model the empirical relationship between wages and unemployment
in form of a 'wage curve' following Blanch
ower and Oswald (1994; 1995).
We nd that higher migration is associated with larger GDP and em-
ployment gains, but also with a smaller wage increase and a smaller decline
of the unemployment rate. The diversion of migration 
ows away from Ger-
many towards the UK yields thus a higher GDP and employment growth in
the UK and a lower in Germany.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section
presents descriptive evidence on the diversion of migration away from main
destinations such as Germany and Austria towards the UK and Ireland by
4The equations of the CGE model are available from the authors on request.
3comparing migration patterns before and after the EU Eastern enlargement
(Section 2). Section 3 provides the two migration scenarios which form
the basis for the further analysis. Section 4 discusses the methodology and
theoretical foundations of the CGE model. Section 5 presents the results of
our simulations and Section 6 concludes.
2 Migration diversion after EU enlargement
The 2004 enlargement round has resulted in a distinct increase in migration
from the NMS-8 into the EU-15, although total migration 
ows have been
lower than predicted for the case of an EU-wide introduction the free move-
ment of workers. Table 1 presents the stock of foreign nationals from the
NMS-8 residing in the EU-15. Migration data are poorly reported in most
EU member states, such that some uncertainty surrounds the estimates of
the actual scale of east-west migration.5 Based on the information of those
countries which provide migration gures by country of origin and on the
information of the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) for those countries
which do not, we can estimate the net increase in the number of foreign res-
idents from the NMS-8 in the EU-15 at 200,000-250,000 persons per annum
since 2004.6
Table 1 about here
This net increase in the stock of migrants from the NMS-8 is below most
estimates which have been carried out prior to the EU Eastern enlargement
under the counterfactual assumption that all EU-15 member states will open
their labour markets at the same time. There has been a wide range of stud-
ies which have estimated potential migration from the NMS (see Alecke et
al., 2001; Br ucker and Siliverstovs 2006a, 2006b; Straubhaar, 2002, for re-
views). These studies have relied either on extrapolations of south-north
migration in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Layard et al., 1992),
surveys among the population of the new member states (e.g. Krieger,
5This is particularly true for Ireland and the UK, the main destinations of migration
from the NMS since enlargement. For a detailed examination of the UK immigration data
see Blanch
ower et al. (2007).
6Note that the number of foreign residents from the NMS-8 in Table 1 would have
been about 70,000 persons higher in 2005 and 2006 if Germany would have not revised
the foreigner statistics.
42003), or econometric estimates considering inter alia dierences in income
levels and labour market conditions across countries as explanatory variables
(e.g. Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Boeri and Br ucker, 2001; Dustmann et al.,
2003). Under the counterfactual assumption that the free movement will
be introduced in all EU member states at the same time, the majority of
these studies predicted for the EU-15 a long-run migration potential of 3-5
percent of the population from the NMS, and a short-run net in
ow of about
300,000-400,000 persons per annum (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 1999; Boeri and Br ucker, 2001; Bruder, 2004; Krieger, 2003;
Layard et al., 1992). These estimates have been conrmed by some recent
estimates which have been carried out after enlargement and use current
data (Pytlikova, 2007; Zaiceva, 2006). Some studies have obtained signi-
cantly lower (Fertig, 2001; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2003)
or higher estimates (Sinn et al., 2001) for the migration potential. However,
Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) and Br ucker and Siliverstovs (2006a; 2006b) have
demonstrated that the forecasting performance of the xed eects estima-
tors which are employed by most of the mainstream projections dominate
other estimators such as the pooled OLS estimator which is inter alia used
by Sinn et al. (2001) and yields much higher estimates of the migration
potential. We thus conclude that actual post-enlargement migration 
ows
from the NMS-8 into the EU-15 stand at about two-thirds of the migration
potential which has been predicted by most studies.
That actual migration 
ows are below the predictions before EU enlarge-
ment is hardly surprising, given that many of the incumbent EU member
states have opened their labour markets only partially or not at all. We
however observe also a reversal in the allocation of migration 
ows from
the NMS-8 across the EU-15 countries since enlargement: In 2000, nearly
70 percent of the foreign citizens from the NMS-8 residing in the EU were
registered in Austria and Germany. This share has fallen to 43 percent in
2006. At a net increase of the foreign population of 110,000 and 150,000
persons per annum in the two years following enlargement, the UK and
Ireland receive 56% of the net in
ows since 2004 compared to 15% before
enlargement. In contrast, Austria and Germany receive only 21% of the
in
ows since 2004.7
As a consequence, the UK and Ireland have received much higher mi-
gration in
ows than predicted by most studies under the counterfactual
7We have corrected for the revision of the migration statistics in Germany by using the
net immigration gure for the increase of the migration stock in 2005 in the calculation
of the net in
ows.
5assumption that all EU-15 countries will open their labour markets at the
same time. Interestingly enough, this does not hold true for the Scandina-
vian countries: although Sweden has opened its labour market completely,
and Denmark largely, net migration 
ows into these two countries have been
- at some 6,000 persons - almost negligible in the two years since enlarge-
ment. Language, and, perhaps, dierences in labour market institutions,
might have played an important role in shaping the direction of east-west
migration 
ows.
Altogether, we conclude that the selective application of immigration
restrictions during the transitional periods has resulted in (i) a lower immi-
gration from the NMS-8 into the EU-15 than expected under the assumption
of an EU-wide introduction of the free movement, and (ii) a substantial di-
version of migration 
ows away from the main destinations prior to enlarge-
ment towards the UK and Ireland which have opened their labour markets
immediately after EU enlargement.
3 Migration scenarios and other assumptions
For the assessment of the macroeconomic eects of migration diversion we
employ two policy scenarios and a benchmark scenario. The rst policy sce-
nario is based on the assumption that both Germany and the UK maintain
the status quo in their immigration policies. Germany applies thus the same
set of immigration restrictions for workers from the NMS-8 until the end of
the transitional periods, while the UK continues to grant workers from the
NMS-8 free access to its labour market.
As a consequence, we assume that the UK continues to receive a large
in
ow of migrants from the NMS-8. The scenario for migration from the
NMS-8 to the UK is derived from the migration scenario in Alvarez-Plata
et al. (2003) for Germany. More specically, we have assumed that the
proportion of migration from the NMS-8 to the UK in the years 2004-06
relative to potential migration from the NMS-8 to Germany according to
the scenario in Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) remains constant over time. This
implies that the number of immigrants tends to decrease over time. For
Germany we assume that the average net immigration rate from the NMS-8
following the rst two years after enlargement remains constant until the
end of the transitional periods.
The second policy scenario relies on the counterfactual assumption that
Germany and the UK have both opened their labour markets for workers
from the NMS-8 already in 2004. As a consequence, total migration from
6the NMS-8 into the EU-15 will increase. Germany receives more migrants
and the UK less.
This counterfactual policy scenario is of course hard to quantify since we
cannot observe actual migration 
ows under the assumption of an EU-wide
application of the Community rules for the free movement of workers. For
a quantication of this assumption we use again the migration scenario in
Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003), which is based on the estimation of the elastic-
ities of migration with respect to income dierences and employment rates
under the condition of free movement. Moreover, in contrast to most other
studies in the literature, Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) have tested the out-
of-sample forecasting performance of dierent estimators before applying a
certain estimation method. Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) provide an estimate
of potential migration from the NMS to Germany and extrapolate this esti-
mate to the other EU-15 countries.8 Following this approach, we extrapolate
the projection in Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) on basis of the pre-enlargement
distribution of migration stocks from the NMS-8 across the EU-15 in the
beginning of the year 2004 to the UK.9 The policy scenarios are displayed
in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
The EU Eastern enlargement does not only aect migration, but also
trade and capital movements. We assume therefore in both policy scenarios
that the removal of barriers to trade and capital movements is irreversible
and that therefore the dynamic development in trade and capital 
ows con-
tinues. Trade and capital movements have considerably increased before and
after the EU-enlargement, but the individual member states are aected in
dierent ways: The EU-15 countries neighbouring the NMS such as Austria
and Germany have the highest trade shares with the NMS, while the UK
8Most EU-15 countries do not provide long-time series of migration stocks and 
ows
which can be used for reliable forecasts. Particularly the migration data for the UK which
rely on the Passenger Survey suer from several shortcomings, see e.g. Blanch
ower et
al. (2007) and Dustmann et al. (2003). The forecasting performance of gravity-type
estimates which are based on panels of receiving and sending countries in the EU is
therefore relatively poor compared to estimates which are based only on one destination
and a panel of sending countries. See Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003).
9Our gures however deviate from those in Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003) since we use the
regional distribution across the EU-15 at the beginning of 2004 and not that of the year
2000.
7and Ireland are only moderately aected. As an example, Germany exported
goods of a value of 89.7 billion Euros to the NMS and imported goods of
a value 74.2 billion Euros from the NMS in 2006 (Deutsche Bundesbank,
2007), while exports of the UK to the NMS amounted to 31.2 billion Euros
and imports to 41.1 billion Euros (ONS, 2006). We assume here that the dy-
namic development of trade and capital movements continues. The impact
of opening labour markets to migration on trade and capital movements is
re
ected by our CGE model.
The eects of the two policy scenarios are compared with a baseline
scenario which describes a world without enlargement. Our policy scenarios
have to be considered as a counterfactual experiment which tempt to capture
potential diversion eects. All studies which forecast the migration potential
from the NMS highlight the uncertainty surrounding the estimates such that
all results have to be interpreted with care.
4 Outline of the CGE Model
The CGE model employed here can be classied as a comparative static
model based on the IFPRI framework. The IFPRI type models follow the
neoclassic-structuralist modeling tradition rst presented in Dervis et al.
(1982). The equations of the model are derived from microeconomic as-
sumptions about the behaviour of price taking agents. Consumers maximise
utility subject to their budget constraints. Producer chose inputs so as to
minimise production costs. Production technologies are characterised by a
CES or Leontief function whereby resources are limited and distributed by
market forces.
The model consists of n = 16 commodities, m = 16 domestic industries,
and n = 2 type of households, migrants and natives. In total there are
2 agricultural industries, 4 manufacturing industries and 10 service indus-
tries. Each commodity corresponds to an industry. The consideration of two
types of households allows considering the dierent consumption behaviour
of native and migrant households. The empirical basis of the model form
the current input-output matrices from Eurostat which enables us to con-
sider the recent developments in the interconnection between trade, factor
movements and production.
In order to capture the eects of the European integration process we
enhanced the two country framework of the IFPRI model to a three country
framework which re
ects one country and two regions, the EU and the rest
of the world. The German and the UK economy is linked to the EU and
8to the rest of the world via trade in goods and services, capital 
ows and
the migration of labour. Transaction costs within the EU are lower. EU
Enlargement therefore triggers the reduction of transaction goods for trade
in goods and services as well as for capital movements and migration.
Government consumption is restricted to tax income and borrowing
which has implications for other economic agents. Within the government
sector transfers to the budget of the EU are considered. In particular, special
features such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are modeled. The
model captures thus both the eects of integrating the NMS into the Com-
mon Market of the EU as well as the eects of Enlargement on governmental
transfers.
An important feature of the model is the re
ection of labour market
imperfections by a wage curve which is novel in the CGE literature on the
eects of the EU Eastern enlargement.10 The consideration of labour mar-
ket rigidities through the specication of a wage curve postulates a negative
relationship between the real wage rate and the unemployment rate (Blanch-

ower and Oswald, 1994):
w
P
= f(u); f0 < 0; (1)
where w denotes the wage rate, P the consumer goods price index and u
the unemployment rate. The wage curve can be considered as a short-cut
whose microeconomic foundations can be derived from dierent modes of
wage setting, e.g. models with a monopoly union or a bilateral bargaining
monopoly (e.g. Layard et al., 1991), eciency wage theories (e.g. Salop,
1979) or shirking-models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
The elasticities between the unemployment and the wage rates are taken
from the empirical literature (Blanch
ower and Oswald, 1994; Blanch
ower
and Oswald, 1995). Dierent labour market conditions in Germany and the
UK are re
ected by dierent elasticities of the wage curve. The wage curve
has thus an elasticity of -0.1 in Germany and of -0.13 in the UK.
The model is solved using the GAMS software initially developed by the
World Bank. Within the GAMS package we use the Path Solver which is
designed to solve mixed complementarity problems.
10For a similar approach in an analytical model see Boeri and Br ucker (2005) and Levine
(1999).
95 Results
Table 3 presents the macroeconomic eects of the EU Eastern enlargement
for the UK and Germany. The simulations presented here consider the
impact of Eastern enlargement on migration, trade, capital movements and
governmental transfers. As outlined in Section 3, the eects of migration
diversion are captured by two policy scenarios: the rst scenario displays
the status quo in immigration policies for both Germany and the UK, while
the second scenario is based on the counterfactual assumption that all EU
member states have opened their labour markets for migration from the
NMS already in 2004. We can thus compare the counterfactual scenario of
a world with free movement with a world where migration barriers hinder
migration and divert migration 
ows away from the preferred destinations.
These two policy scenarios are compared with a baseline scenario which
describes a world without enlargement. The scenarios are calculated for the
period from 2004 to 2011, i.e. they capture the period until the end of the
transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers.
Table 3 about here
The EU Eastern enlargement increases GDP, trade, investment, private
and governmental consumption and employment in all scenarios. Moreover,
enlargement has lifted all boats in the incumbent EU member states: The
real return on capital and wages have increased in the sequitur of the EU
Eastern enlargement, while the unemployment rate is declining. The bene-
ts from enlargement are however not equally distributed: Capital owners
benet more than workers from the integration of the labour abundant NMS.
The diversion of migration 
ows during the transitional periods has re-
sulted in a higher GDP gain for the UK { 1.1 per cent compared to 0.7 per
cent in case of an EU-wide free movement. In contrast, the German GDP
declines in the status quo relative to free movement scenario by about 0.4
per cent. Accordingly, the migration diversion towards the UK increases in-
vestment, private consumption, governmental consumption and trade there
by between 0.4 per cent and 0.6 per cent, while the migration restrictions
reduce it in Germany by a similar amount.
Migration and trade are complements in our simulations, which can be
traced back to the fact that migrants tend to move more than proportional
into the tradable sectors. The diversion of migrants towards the UK in-
10creases exports and imports there by about 0.5 per cent, while German ex-
port and imports fall by about 0.6 per cent compared to the free movement
scenario.
The diversion of migration 
ows increases the income of capital owners
in the UK by almost 0.6 per cent and reduces it in Germany by the same
amount. In contrast, the wage gains drop by 0.4 per cent in the UK as a
result of migration diversion, while lower immigration increases the wage
gains in Germany by 0.3 per cent. Moreover, the diversion process reduces
the decline in the unemployment rate of the UK by 0.3 percentage points,
while the German unemployment rate falls by 0.6 instead of 0.3 percentage
points. Altogether, the migration diversion increases GDP gains from East-
ern enlargement and the income of capital owners in the UK, but reduces
the gains of workers in terms of higher wages and lower unemployment risks.
The converse holds true for Germany.
Note that we nd larger economic gains from the EU Eastern enlarge-
ment than previous studies. As an example, Baldwin et al. (1997) calculate
the total gain in GDP for the EU-15 at 0.2 per cent, while Heijdra et al.
(2002) predicted that EU enlargement will increase the GDP in Germany
by 0.67%. The Hejdra et al. (2002) study is inter alia based on a migration
projection which is similar to our free movement scenario. The dierence
between the ndings in the previous literature and ours can be traced back
mainly to the fact that trade links between the incumbent and the new
EU member states have been largely underestimated in the pre-enlargement
studies.
6 Conclusion
The transitional periods for the free movement of workers have resulted in
a reversal of the pre-enlargement distribution of migrants from the NMS
across the EU-15. Based on a counterfactual scenario, which relies on the
assumption that the free movement of workers would have been granted
to the citizens of the NMS-8 in all EU-15 countries already in 2004, we
have analysed the macroeconomic consequences of this diversion process for
two mainly aected countries, Germany and the UK. Our ndings indicate
that the diversion of migration 
ows has increased the GDP in the UK and
reduced it in Germany. Altogether, the migration restrictions during the
transitional periods have reduced the joint GDP of Germany and the UK
by about 0.11 per cent relative to our counterfactual scenario, which equals
5 billion Euros.
11The transitional periods for the free movement of workers also impact
the distribution of income. The productivity gains from the EU Eastern
enlargement and the increase in trade involves that the income of workers
and capital owners increase, while the unemployment rate declines in all sce-
narios. However, the redirection of migration 
ows towards the UK reduce
the wage gains, while the unemployment rate declines less than in case of
an EU-wide introduction of the free movement. In contrast, workers in Ger-
many benet from the diversion of migration 
ows during the transitional
periods. Thus, although the transitional migration restrictions in Germany
and other EU-15 countries create an aggregate loss for the incumbent EU
member states, their distributional impact remains ambiguous.
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1516Table 1: Residents from the NMS-8 in the EU-15, 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
residents from NMS-8
in 1,000 persons in % of host population
Austria1 41.0 53.7 80.5 78.9 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0
Belgium1 9.5 15.6 25.6 59.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6
Denmark2 10.2 10.5 11.3 13.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Finland3 15.8 16.5 18.3 17.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
France1 35.1 43.0 46.8 29.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Germany4 466.4 480.7 438.8 481.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Greece1 16.4 15.2 20.6 20.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Ireland5 49.1 54.1 58.5 63.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Italy6 42.2 55.6 67.8 79.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Luxembourg1 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Netherlands7 12.2 13.1 17.9 23.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Portugal8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain1 41.5 46.7 61.8 74.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Sweden9 21.4 21.1 23.3 26.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
UK10 78.6 81.4 180.8 328.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
EU-15 841.1 909.0 1,053.4 1,298.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
All gures refer to January 1 of each year.
Notes: 1) Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2006.{ 2) Statistics Denmark (population statis-
tics).{ 3) Statistics Finland (population statistics), 2006: Eurostat LFS.{ 4) Statistisches
Bundesamt (population statistics), 31.12. of previous year. 2006 and 2005 not comparable
to previous years due to data revision.{ 5) 2002: population census; 2005: LFS, other
values estimated.{ 6) 2004-06: ISTAT (population statistics); 2000-03: Council of Europe.{
7) Statistics Netherlands (population statistics).{ 8) 2000-02: Eurostat LFS. 2003-06:
extrapolation.{ 9) Statistics Sweden (population statistics), 31.12.{ 10) Eurostat LFS
2006. UK LFS data report 240,000 residents for 2004 and 365,000 residents for 2006
from NMS-8.
17Table 2: Migration scenarios, 2004-2011
scenario 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
residents from NMS-8 in 1,000 persons
Germany
status quo 24.0 45.5 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3
free movement
in EU-25 133.6 178.1 178.4 160.4 135.8 110.7 88.1 80.0
United Kingdom
status quo 99.4 147.8 124.9 112.3 95.0 77.5 61.6 56.0
free movement
in EU-25 20.1 26.9 26.9 24.2 20.5 16.7 13.3 12.1
See text for assumptions of scenarios.
18Table 3: Macroeconomic eects of migration diversion
status quo free movement
scenario1 scenario2
UK Germany UK Germany
change in %, unemployment rate:
change in %-points
real GDP 1.11 0.86 0.67 1.32
private consumption 1.48 1.27 1.08 1.63
investment 0.78 0.78 0.42 1.28
government consumption 1.31 0.52 0.66 0.80
tax revenue 1.17 0.86 0.72 1.32
exports to EU3 countries 2.59 2.57 2.12 3.19
exports to RoW4 countries 1.33 1.05 0.91 1.67
imports from EU countries 3.75 3.38 3.31 3.75
imports from RoW countries 1.63 1.50 1.14 1.86
capital income 2.02 1.81 1.46 2.37
wage rate 0.20 0.89 0.63 0.51
employment 1.48 0.90 0.75 1.65
unemployment rate -0.13 -0.58 -0.41 -0.34
Notes: 1) The status quo scenario assumes that Germany main-
tains its migration restrictions and that UK keeps its labour
markets open.{ 2) The free movement scenario assumes that all
EU-15 countries grant free movement for workers from the NMS-8.{
3) EU countries are the other EU-25 member states.{ 4) RoW
countries are all other trading partners.
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